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Abstract—The impact of wholesale prices is examined in a
context where the end customer access both free content and pay-
per-use content, delivered by two different providers through a
common network provider. We formulate and solve the game
between the network provider and the pay-per-use content
provider, where both use the price they separately charge the
end customer with as a leverage to maximize their profits. In
the neutral case (the network provider charges equal wholesale
prices to the two content providers), the benefits coming from
wholesale price reductions are largely retained by the pay-per-
use content provider. When the free content provider is charged
more than its pay-per-use competitor, both the network provider
and the pay-per-use content provider see their profit increase,
while the end customer experiences a negligible reduction in the
retail price.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent years, the Internet has become a major
medium for content delivery, to an extent that destabilizes the
traditional supply and delivery chains for entertainment and
news contents. As a result, the sale and delivery of multimedia
content through the Internet keeps increasing, the most famous
example being the video-on-demand provider Netflix, whose
revenue increased by 29% in 2010, and by around 40% in
2011. But the corresponding traffic load grew accordingly:
with 30% of total traffic in the US, Netflix now represents
more traffic than the popular peer-to-peer BitTorrent [11].
Content providers use the Internet as a delivery means,
however they are charged only by the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) they are directly connected to, who may adapt the
connection price to the treated traffic. On the other hand, most
consumers subscribe to an ISP that is not one of the content
providers, so that their ISP has to relay the traffic issued by
content providers without being paid by the latter. When ISPs
are connected through transit agreements, this asymmetry can
be compensated by transit fees: the ISPs providing access
to the major sources of traffic pay more than those whose
customers are mainly traffic sinks. Instead, when connections
between ISPs are established so that neither party pays the
other for the exchanged traffic (the sender keeps all agreement
that is known as peering [5]), the ISPs who count big content
providers among their clients appear as free-riders for the other
ISPs, with ensuing strains on the business model.
A possibility to solve that issue, advocated by some major
ISPs, is that content providers be directly charged by all ISPs
serving their flows, and not only by their access provider,
through some so-called side payments. A mounting pressure
towards that direction comes from ISPs, and overflows on
regulators [10]. Though negated by ISPs, such a solution may
appear to contradict the network neutrality principle, stating
that all packets in the network should be treated equally,
independently of their origin, destination, or associated appli-
cation [3]. Also, the unit price may be different for different
content providers, spurring additional neutrality issues: one
of the content providers may have a preferred commercial
liaison with the ISP and get better prices. The position of many
content providers is to forbid such side payments, that would
endanger their survival and harm their ability to create content,
which will also favor the illegal exchange of content. On the
other hand, ISPs claim that such payments are necessary for
them to continue improving the quality of service by investing
in network expansions.
The problem of side-payments in the context of Network
Neutrality has recently been studied quite extensively. In [4],
only one (pay-per-use) content provider is considered, and
it is claimed that ISPs are right to ask for a fairer share of
the overall revenues, but that this cannot be achieved through
side payments. In [6], [7], the focus is on revenue sharing
rules among stakeholders, while the use of side-payments as
a tool to reach such a sharing should also be investigated. In
particular, the identity and the objectives of the price setter
for those payments is likely to have a major role, as we can
imagine side-payments to be decided by a regulator in order to
favor users, or by one network stakeholder trying to optimize
revenue. The effect of side payments is also investigated in [8],
where their effect in terms of investment incentives for ISPs
is shown to be positive.
Though this picture may appear as a case of competition
between the two classes of content providers, or between the
content providers and the ISPs, an often neglected stakeholder
is the end customer, who should instead be protected by the
legislation. In fact, any policy taken by the ISPs and the con-
tent providers provokes consequences on the end customers,
through the variety of accessible content and the prices paid.
In this paper, we analyse how changes in the wholesale
prices (i.e., the charges levied on the content providers) are
transferred to the end customer, and we assess how deviations
from the neutral approach affect the retail prices asked of the
end customer. Namely, we consider the case of two archetypal
content providers, who deliver their content respectively free
of charge and on a pay-per-use basis. The end customer
accesses their services through its ISP. In the solution based on
side payments, both content providers are charged per volume
by that ISP. We consider the charging policy by the ISP to be
neutral if the unit prices charged to the two content providers
are equal, and non-neutral otherwise.
We formulate the strategical decisions taken by the ISP and
the pay-per-use content provider as a game, where the two
players use the unit price imposed on the end customer as
their leverage to maximize their surplus. We find that, for
the wide range of cases examined, the game always exhibits
a single Nash equilibrium. In the neutral case, the ISP may
be forced to reduce its wholesale prices to favour access to
content. However, we find that the end customer is barely
affected by such price reductions: for each percent reduction
in the wholesale price, the overall retail price paid by the
customer decreases by no more than 0.2 percent roughly. The
benefit of wholesale price reductions is largely retained by the
pay-per-use content provider. At the same time, in the non-
neutral case (higher prices for the free content provider), the
pay-per-use content provider is largely favoured, with its profit
increasing linearly with the wholesale price for the free content
provider. However, the overall effect on the end customer is
negligible, but in the wrong direction. When the wholesale
price for the free content provider doubles, the price paid
by the end customer increases as well, though by less than
3%. This raises the suspicion that the ISP and the pay-per-use
content provider may be induced into a colluding behaviour
without the end customer directly perceiving it, a situation that
should be further investigated.
II. PROVIDERS AND PAYMENT FLOWS
Several stakeholders play a role in the provision of content
to end customers. In this section, we describe the roles played
by the most important actors, and provide a model for their
interactions.
We consider two content providers: a provider F of free
content, and a provider P of pay-per-use content. A customer
U retrieves the contents provided by F and P through the
network operator N . In the following, we refer to a single
customer, representative of the collective behaviour of all the
customers.
The content providers pay the network operator for the use
of the network backbone. The payment is proportional to the
volume of traffic delivered by the two content providers, but
the unit price may be different. Namely, F pays a price tF per
volume unit; and provider P pays a unit price tP. If tF 6= tP, we
consider that the network operator is applying a non-neutral
pricing policy.
The content provider F provides free content, and receives
no money from its customers. The content provider P receives
instead an amount of money pS from its customers for each
unit of traffic delivered. Both content providers benefit from
advertisement, receiving respectively the unit revenues vF and
vP .
On the other hand, the customer U pays both the network
operator and the content provider P . It pays the network oper-
ator to access the network, through a two-part tariffing scheme.
That tariffing scheme includes a fixed fee a plus a volume-
proportional variable component. The price per unit volume
is pN. In addition, it pays the content provider P a price pS
per unit volume. If we indicate by DP and by DF the traffic
delivered respectively by the content provider P and by F ,
the overall expense by the user is a+pN (DP +DF )+pSDP .
While the total charges depend on the demand levels DP
and DF , those demand levels are in turn determined by the
prices through the following demand functions, inspired by
[2]:
DP = D0,P max[1− α(pS + pN ) + βpN , 0]
DF = D0,F max[1− αˆpN + βˆ(pS + pN ), 0],
(1)
with α, β, αˆ, βˆ > 0 to illustrate that a price decrease (resp.
increase) at a given content provider will result in a demand
increase (resp. decrease) at this provider, and demand decrease
(resp. increase) at the opponent. In those equations, we employ
the maximum operator to ensure that the demand function
provides a non-negative value.
We also assume, that a uniform price increase in any of the
two alternatives between P and F (i.e., increasing from the
same level pN , paid for each unit of free content volume, and
pN + pS , paid for each unit of pay-per-use content volume)
cannot result in an increase of demand level for any of the
two players. In mathematical terms, this is expressed by the
following constraint:
α > β and αˆ > βˆ. (2)
Finally, it is of practical value to assume that a price increase
by a given provider cannot result in an increase of the total
demand volume, which can be translated on the coefficients
into
αD0,P > βˆD0,F and αˆD0,F > βˆD0,F + βD0,P ,
vF
F
vP
P
N
tF tP
U
a pN
pS
Fig. 1. Flows of payments. All prices are per unit of flow, except the per-user
subscription price a.
by summing the two demand functions and looking at the
conditions under which the derivatives with respect to pN and
pS are negative.
We can also see the conditions for zeroing the demand. The
demand for paid services becomes zero when the following
condition is satisfied:
1− αpS − (α− β)pN ≤ 0⇔ pN ≥ 1− αpS
α− β . (3)
This gives the upper bound
pPN =
1− αpS
α− β . (4)
On the other hand the demand for free services goes to zero
when the price paid to the network operator is so large that
1− αˆpN + βˆ(pS + pN ) ≤ 0⇔ pN ≥ 1 + βˆpS
αˆ− βˆ . (5)
This gives the upper bound
pFN =
1 + βˆpS
αˆ− βˆ . (6)
Through the services provided by the two content providers,
the network provider receives money from three sources: the
customer, and the two content providers. All the flows of
money described in this section are shown in Fig. 1.
At the same time, both the content providers and the
network operator experience operational expenses (OPEX),
assumed to be proportional to the amount of delivered traffic.
The unit OPEX for the two content providers are respectively
sF and sP . On the other hand, the network operator has to
pay the operational expenses related to the transport backbone
(which links the two content providers to it) and to the access
link. Its unit OPEX are nF , nP (costs per unit volume due to
the transport of F and P traffic, respectively), and k (cost per
unit volume due to the access link). Note that nF and nP are
costs per unit volume, while k is a cost per customer.
As a result, we can write the profit of the network operator
ΠN = a−k+pN (DF +DP )+(tP −nP )DP +(tF −nF )DF .
(7)
Instead, for the content provider P we have the profit
ΠP = (pS + vP − tP − sP )DP . (8)
III. THE PRICING GAME
The two players, P and N , aim at maximizing their
respective profit, non-cooperatively. The content provider P
plays by using the unit price pS as its leverage, while the
network operator N acts on pN . This game is played while
the other parameters are fixed. The goal is to determine an
equilibrium situation when no provider can increase its profit
by unilaterally changing its price. This type of equilibrium is
called a Nash equilibrium [9].
In order to find a Nash equilibrium, we first compute the
best-response function of each provider, that is, the function
giving the price value(s) maximizing the profit of the consid-
ered provider, defined in terms of the price strategy of the
opponent. Formally:
BRN (pS) = arg max
pN≥0
ΠN (pN , pS)
BRP (pN ) = arg max
pS≥0
ΠS(pN , pS).
(9)
A Nash equilibrium is simply a point (p∗N , p
∗
S) for which
BRN (p∗S) = p
∗
N (or p
∗
N ∈ BRN (p∗S) if it is made of several
solutions) and equivalently BRP (p∗N ) = p
∗
S . Graphically, if
we draw the two best response curves on the same figure,
the set of Nash equilibria is then the (possibly empty) set of
intersection points of those curves.
The following propositions give the best-response functions
of P and N in terms of the price of the opponent.
Proposition 1. The best-response function BRP of content
provider P is:
BRP (pN ) = max
(
0,
1 + (β − α)pN − α(vp − tP − sP )
2α
)
.
Proof: Recall from Equation (8) that the profit of the
content provider P is
ΠP = (pS+vP−tP−sP )D0,P max[0, 1−α(pS+pN )+βpN ].
(10)
The upper bound (3) for the price pN giving a null demand
also shows that ΠP = 0 if pS ≥ pS,max := 1−(α−β)pNα . When
pS is less than pS,max,
∂ΠP
∂pS
= D0,P [1− α(2pS + pN + vP − tP − sP ) + βpN ]
= D0,P [1 + (β − α)pN − α(vp − tP − sP )− 2αpS ] .
(11)
This derivative is increasing for pS less than
p∗S =
1 + (β − α)pN − α(vP − tP − sP )
2α
, (12)
and decreasing if pS is larger than p∗S . As a consequence, the
maximum value is obtained at BRP (pN ) = max(0, p∗S), hence
the proposition.
Similarly, we can look at the best response of the network
provider N (in the following, we suppose that the transport
price towards the free content provider is always set so as to
recover at least the pertaining OPEX). We can identify three
different cases, depending on the values of the upper bounds
pPN and p
F
N .
Proposition 2. The best-response function BRN of network
provider N is one of the following values:
Case 1 (pPN ≤ 0)
The best response function is
BRN (pS) = max
(
0,
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(tF − nF )
2(αˆ− βˆ)
)
.
Case 2 (0 < pPN ≤ pFN )
The best response function is the value of pN yielding the
largest profit between the two alternatives
min
pPN , pFN − tF + nF + D0,PD0,F α−βαˆ−βˆ
(
pPN − tP + nP
)
2
(
1 +
D0,P
D0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
) ∣∣∣∣
+
 .
and
max
(
pPN ,
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(tF − nF )
2(αˆ− βˆ)
)
.
Case 3 (0 < pFN ≤ pPN )
The best response function is the value of pN yielding the
largest profit between the two alternatives
min
pFN , pFN − tF + nF + D0,PD0,F α−βαˆ−βˆ
(
pPN − tP + nP )
)
2
(
1 +
D0,P
D0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
) ∣∣∣∣
+
 .
and
max
(
pFN ,
1− αpS − (α− β)(tP − nP )
2(α− β)
)
.
where we have used the notation x|+ = max(x, 0).
Proof: In order to determine the value pN that maximizes
the profit of N ,
ΠN =a− k + pN (DF +DP )+
(tP − nP )DP + (tF − nF )DF ,
we first need to look at the conditions under which both
demands DP and DF are positive. We know that DP > 0
iff pN < pPN , and DF > 0 iff pN < p
F
N .
Noting that pFN > 0, we then have to consider the three
possibilities on the sign of pPN and the relative values of p
F
N
and pPN :
Case 1.
If pPN ≤ 0: we have DP = 0 and ΠN = a− k + pNDF +
(tF − nF )DF . Differentiating with respect to pN on [0, pFN ],
we have
∂ΠN
∂pN
= D0,F
(
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(2pN + tF − nF )
)
.
Remark that this derivative becomes 0 when
pN = p
∗
N =
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(tF − nF )
2(αˆ− βˆ)
=
1 + βˆpS
2(αˆ− βˆ) −
tF − nF
2
,
(13)
which is less than pFN if tF > nF . As a consequence, we get
BRN (pS) = max
(
0,
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(tF − nF )
2(αˆ− βˆ)
)
.
(14)
Case 2.
If 0 < pPN ≤ pFN : then for pN ∈ [0, pPN ), DP , DF > 0
while for pN ∈ [pPN , pFN ), only DF > 0. We need to look at
those two intervals separately. On [0, pPN ), the derivative is
∂ΠN
∂pN
=D0,F
(
1− αˆpN + βˆ(pS + pN )
)
+
D0,P (1− α(pS + pN ) + βpN ) +
(pN + tP − nP )D0,P (β − α)+
(pN + tF − nF )D0,F (βˆ − αˆ).
(15)
Recalling the expressions (6) and (4) for the upper bounds
on the price, the price zeroing the above derivative can be
expressed as
p∗N =
pFN − tF + nF + D0,PD0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
(
pPN − tP + nP )
)
2
(
1 +
D0,P
D0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
) . (16)
The optimal value on this interval is then
BRN (pS) =
min
pPN , pFN − tF + nF + D0,PD0,F α−βαˆ−βˆ
(
pPN − tP + nP
)
2
(
1 +
D0,P
D0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
) ∣∣∣∣
+
 .
(17)
On [pPN , p
F
N ), DP = 0 and DF > 0 and we are back to
Case 1, but with a restricted interval, leading to an optimal
value on this interval
BRN (pS) = max
(
pPN ,
1 + βˆpS − (αˆ− βˆ)(tF − nF )
2(αˆ− βˆ)
)
.
(18)
After obtaining the solutions for the two subcases, we will
retain the price yielding the larger profit for the network
provider.
Case 3.
If 0 < pFN ≤ pPN , we have the same situation as in Case 2,
but with reversed role for the two demands.
When pN ∈ [0, pFN ), we have DP , DF > 0. The best
response is
BRN (pS) =
min
pFN , pFN − tF + nF + D0,PD0,F α−βαˆ−βˆ
(
pPN − tP + nP
)
2
(
1 +
D0,P
D0,F
α−β
αˆ−βˆ
) ∣∣∣∣
+
 .
(19)
Instead, when pN ∈ [pFN , pPN ), the demand for free content
zeroes, and the best response becomes
BRN (pS) = max
(
pFN ,
1− αpS − (α− β)(tP − nP )
2(α− β)
)
.
(20)
Again, after obtaining the solutions for the two subcases, we
will retain the price yielding the larger profit for the network
provider.
This concludes the proof.
IV. EQUILIBRIUM RETAIL PRICES
In Section III we have derived the best response functions.
The intersection of the best response functions provides us
with the Nash equilibrium solution of the game. In this
section we explore what happens in a sample scenario, under
both neutrality and non-neutrality conditions. Namely, we
investigate the existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria,
the impact of wholesale price on the retail price offered to the
customer and on the providers’ profits.
A. A sample scenario
We want to study the behaviour of the pay-per-use content
provider and of the network provider when the network
provider acts on the transport unit prices tF and tP . By
acting on those prices, the network provider may exhibit
a non-neutral standing towards the two content providers.
Namely, when tF = tP , we label its behaviour as neutral.
Instead, when tF 6= tP , its price decision favours either of the
two contenders: a higher price for the free content provider
(tF > tP ) benefits the pay-per-use content provider, and vice
versa. We can explore the full range of situations by moving
in the tP − tF plane, having set all the other parameters, with
tF = λtP (λ = 1 case corresponds to the neutral behaviour).
In order to analyse those issues, we have set the values for
the other parameters by gathering data on the current market
conditions. Namely, in the following we have used the values
reported in Table I, based on data extracted from the Annual
Report of the Italian Communication Regulatory Authority
(AGCOM) [1].
As to transport unit prices tF and tP , we have set a range
of variation [0, 0.5] ¤/GB, which includes the case of free
transport as a limit situation.
B. Neutrality
We start by examining what happens under neutral price
setting by the network provider. We therefore set tF = tP and
let them vary together from the maximum value 0.5 down to
free transport. Under all values of the two transport prices, the
pricing game between N and P exhibits a single equilibrium.
The corresponding equilibrium prices pS and pN are shown
in Fig. ??. Changing the transport price has an opposite impact
on the two equilibrium prices. When the transport price lowers,
the price set by the pay-per-use content provider lowers as
well, as a result of the diminished pressure by the network
provider, which, on the other hand, must increase its retail
price to compensate for the lowered wholesale revenue.
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Changing the transport prices impacts on the retail prices.
We can evaluate the extent, by computing the elasticity of
retail prices, namely, of the retail price pS set by the content
provider and that of the overall price pS + pN experienced by
the customer. The elasticities provide us with the percentage
variation in the retail price as the result of a unit percent
change in the transport price:
εS =
tP
pS
∂pS
∂tP
εS+N =
tP
pS + pN
∂(pS + pN )
∂tP
. (21)
We can evaluate both expressions numerically as we lower the
transport unit price. The results are shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.
Both values are way below unity, meaning in terms of transfer
of price reduction: for the range of transport price examined,
for each percent reduction in the transport price, the overall
retail price paid by the customer decreases by no more than
0.2 percent roughly. The benefit of transport price reductions
is largely retained by the content provider.
We now consider the impact of transport price changes on
the providers’ profit. In Fig. 4, the network provider’s profit
falls linearly as the transport prices decrease. The content
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Fig. 6. Elasticity of the retail price with free content provider disadvantaged
provider benefits from that reduction, but not over the whole
range of variation: when the transport unit price gets below
the 0.3 value, the profit of the content provider stays fairly
constant.
C. Non neutrality
We now turn to the case where the network provider takes a
non-neutral stance. In particular, we examine here the case of
prices favourable to the pay-per-use content provider. We set
tP = 0.25 (halfway the range of variation we have assumed)
and let the transport price ratio λ vary between 1 and 2. The
free content provider is progressively cornered as the transport
price tF increases.
For all values considered, the game exhibits a single equilib-
rium. The resulting prices are shown in Fig. 5. Though the pay-
per-use provider is not directly affected by the price paid by
the free content provider, the price it asks its customers grows
slightly. This is compensated for by the expected decrease in
the price the network provider asks the customers (the pay-
ments from the free content provider to the network provider
increase). The overall effect on the customer is negligible: the
price pS + pN paid by the customer increases by less than
3% when the transport price tF doubles from 0.25 to 0.5.
This is confirmed by the elasticity of the total price pS + pN ,
shown in Fig. 6. Both the network provider and the pay-per-
use content provider benefit from the increased transport prices
suffered by the free content provider. The network provider’s
profit increases due to the increased tF price; the pay-per-
use content provider reaches a more convenient equilibrium at
higher pS prices. As the price ratio tF /tP increases, the profits
of both providers grow linearly, as shown in Fig. 7. Since both
providers benefit from cornering the free content provider, the
danger of collusion exists and should be investigated.
V. CONCLUSION
We have examined the issue of a non-neutral approach by
the network provider towards content providers offering their
services respectively free of charge and on a pay-per-use basis.
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Fig. 7. Profits with free content provider disadvantaged
We have formulated and solved the game between the network
provider and the pay-per-use provider, when both use the retail
price charged to the end customer. When the network provider
charges the two content providers with equal wholesale prices,
we find that just a small portions of the wholesale price
reductions is transferred to the end customer. In the non-
neutral case, when the network provider discriminates against
the free content provider by charging it more, the profits of
both the network provider and the pay-per-use content provider
grow, while the retail price increases (though by a small
amount). A non-neutral approach appears to spur collusive
behaviour, with no benefit at all for the end customer.
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